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I. INTRODUCTION
Long considered a dead letter, the Second Amendment roared back to
life in spring 2007 when the District of Columbia Circuit held that the
District of Columbia’s (“District”) ban on handguns was an impermissible
violation of the Second Amendment.1 Parker v. District of Columbia was
unprecedented; although the Fifth Circuit previously held that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms, it sustained
the gun control law at issue.2 With the Parker decision, however, a court
held for the first time not only that the Second Amendment protected an
individual right to keep and bear arms but also that the underlying gun
control law was unconstitutional.3 The Parker court’s decision constituted
1. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(limiting its holding to handgun possession inside the home for self-defense purposes
and not reaching whether owners may carry handguns in public or in automobiles).
2. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 264-65 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding
that the Second Amendment allows the restriction of gun ownership in cases where the
gun owner is subject to a domestic restraining order).
3. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 401 (reversing the decision of the District Court and
ordering summary judgment for the plaintiff); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2,
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (No. 07-290) (arguing that the
court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment was in error and that it is reasonable to
ban handguns when other firearms are permitted).
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an irreconcilable split among the circuits and set the stage for Supreme
Court intervention.4
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court should affirm the District
of Columbia Circuit and hold that the Second Amendment protects an
individual right to keep and bear arms within the home for self-defense
purposes. Moreover, the Supreme Court should hold that this right is not
fundamental and should apply a deferential, reasonableness review
balancing test to cases involving purported infringement of the Second
Amendment. Part II of this Comment provides the background for Second
Amendment jurisprudence and discusses the history behind the District’s
gun ban and the resulting litigation. Part III of this Comment argues that
the Supreme Court should hold that the Second Amendment protects an
individual right to keep and bear firearms within the home for lawful selfdefense. This Comment concludes with a recommendation that the District
rewrite its gun laws to allow for lawful self-defense within the home.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Second Amendment: Initial Considerations
1. Theories of Interpretation
The Second Amendment reads, “[a] well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”5 For years, Second Amendment
interpretation focused on whether it protects a collective or individual right
to bear arms.6 Collective right theorists believe that the Second
Amendment protects the states’ rights to maintain their militias.7
Collective right theorists argue that because no individual right to bear
arms exists, the government may lawfully restrict, or even ban, firearms
possession.8 The majority of the federal circuits espouse this theory.9
4. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 2.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
6. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Putting the Gun Control Debate in Social Perspective,

73 FORDHAM L. REV. 477, 481 (2004) (suggesting that individual politics and values,
not constitutional interpretation or history, drive each theory).
7. See id. at 482 (describing that the Second Amendment protected the states from
the federal government by prohibiting Congress from regulating firearms to the
detriment of the states).
8. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 2 (arguing that there
is no individual right to keep and bear arms and that the District’s ban on handguns is
constitutional).
9. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 381 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(observing that the First, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits adhere to the collective right theory).
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In contrast, individual right theorists believe that the Second Amendment
protects an individual right to bear arms, noting that the framers commonly
would have understood the term “militia” to include the entire population
of white males who were expected to keep and bear arms on demand.10
Individual right theorists assert that it was commonly accepted and
unremarkable that the framers enjoyed a right to keep and bear arms for
self-defense.11 A minority of the federal circuits espouse this theory.12
2. Recent Trends in Legal Scholarship
The Parker decision represents the culmination of two decades of legal
scholarship that unraveled the former consensus surrounding the meaning
of the Second Amendment.13 While courts long have agreed that the
Second Amendment protects the collective right of states to raise militias,
in the last twenty years, even some liberal law professors have come to
believe the Second Amendment protects an individual right to own a gun.14
Previously, legal analysis played a secondary role to political ideology,
with liberals tending to consider the Second Amendment a dead letter.15
Before this trend emerged, nearly all of the circuits embraced the collective
right theory.16 Collective right theorists have suggested this trend may be
the result of “a desire to be provocative” rather than simple “intellectual
honesty.”17 Whatever the reason, the effects of the new scholarship
10. Id. at 387 (describing the second Militia Act of 1792, which required ablebodied white men to obtain a musket or rifle).
11. See David I. Caplan, Gun Registration: Current Firearm Registration Law, in
GUNS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE, AND
THE LAW 257 (Gregg Lee Carter ed., 2002) (asserting that there was an unqualified
right to keep ordinary firearms for personal use in the 1700s).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 264-65 (5th Cir. 2001)
(holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms while
sustaining a federal law restricting ownership); Parker, 478 F.3d at 400-01 (holding
that the Second Amendment precludes an outright ban on handguns).
13. Adam Liptak, A Liberal Case for the Individual Right to Own Guns Helps Sway
the Federal Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2007, at A18 (describing the speed of the
shift in the constitutional debate over gun rights as “breakneck”).
14. See id. (explaining that law professors Laurence Tribe, Akhil Reed Amar, and
Sanford Levinson agree on an individual right interpretation and noting their work has
played a seminal role in “upending” the debate over the Second Amendment); see also
Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to SelfPreservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103, 130 (1987) (declaring that the Second Amendment
protects the right to self-defense, one of the most fundamental individual rights).
15. Liptak, supra note 13, at A18 (quoting law professor Sanford Levinson, who
noted that liberals simply tend to read the Second Amendment out of the Constitution).
Professor Levinson describes himself as an “A.C.L.U.-type who has not ever even
thought of owning a gun.” Id.
16. See id. (explaining that the Fifth Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit do
not adhere to the collective right theory and noting that the Second Circuit has yet to
decide the issue).
17. Id. (citing law professor Carl Bogus, who noted that “[c]ontrarian positions get
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undeniably are reshaping the debate.18
3. Standards of Review
In evaluating laws that infringe constitutional rights, the Supreme Court
uses a variety of tests and levels of scrutiny.19 Where cases involve both an
individual right protected by the Bill of Rights and legitimate governmental
interests, the Supreme Court often uses a balancing test, a sort of
reasonableness review, to determine whether a law offends the
Constitution.20 This middle ground approach requires a formal balancing
of the burden a law places on an individual against the needs of the
government, and asks whether that burden is reasonable; when the burden
on the individual outweighs the governmental interest, the law is
unconstitutional.21 While the federal courts have yet to develop a cohesive
standard of review for Second Amendment cases, all of the states use the
deferential “reasonable regulation” standard.22 Accordingly, there is
uniformity among the states, and any law that reasonably regulates the
arms right is constitutional.23
B. Second Amendment Jurisprudence: From 1939 to 2007
1. The Precedent: United States v. Miller
The Supreme Court has not heard a Second Amendment case in nearly
seventy years.24 The precedent, United States v. Miller, involved two men
who transported an unregistered sawed-off shotgun across state lines in
play” and that “[l]iberal professors supporting gun control draw yawns”).
18. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(describing the leading nineteenth-century authority on the Second Amendment as
supporting an individual right theory and noting the current support of law professor
Laurence Tribe).
19. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (describing the three levels
of scrutiny—strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review—used to
analyze classifications under the Equal Protection Clause).
20. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995)
(asserting that the Fourth Amendment demands a balancing of an individual’s right to
privacy against the government’s interest in conducting a search).
21. See Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV.
683, 717 (2007) (describing the application of this balancing test to Second
Amendment cases in the states and suggesting that a regulation is unconstitutional if it
destroys, literally or figuratively, the right to bear arms).
22. Id. at 686-87.
23. See id. at 687 (noting that nearly all of the state court decisions that use a
reasonableness standard of review uphold gun control laws for public safety).
24. Appellants’ Brief at 50, Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 374
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 04-7041).
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violation of the National Firearms Act of 1934.25 The Supreme Court held
that no evidence suggested that sawed-off shotguns are reasonably related
to use by a well-regulated militia and therefore were not protected by the
Second Amendment.26 The Miller decision, however, is far from clear in
its analysis; although nine circuit courts have read Miller to protect the
collective right of state militias under the Second Amendment, the case
arguably failed to reach the substantive merits altogether.27
2. A Circuit Split Emerges: United States v. Emerson
The first case to break from the post-Miller jurisprudence came in 2001
when the Fifth Circuit held in United States v. Emerson that the Second
Amendment protects a non-absolute, individual right to own a gun.28 The
Emerson court determined that it did not offend the Second Amendment to
bar a particular class of people from possessing a firearm.29 Although the
Emerson court need not have reached whether the right protected was
independent or collective, it represented the beginning of a split among the
circuits and paved the way for Parker.30
C. The District of Columbia Gun Ban
1. Legislative History and Congressional Opposition
In June 1976, the District of Columbia Council (“Council”) enacted its
current gun laws.31 In an effort to reduce the District’s increasing violent
crime, the Council banned possession of all handguns not registered by the
25. 307 U.S. 174, 176 (1939) (discussing that the lower court held the Act did not
attempt to regulate commerce and therefore usurped state police power in violation of
the Second Amendment).
26. Id. at 178 (noting that there was no proof that sawed-off shotguns were
considered ordinary military equipment and that without such proof the Second
Amendment did not attach).
27. See Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942) (finding that the
type of weapon was dispositive in Miller without reaching the question of the nature of
the protected right).
28. 270 F.3d 203, 264-65 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that a restriction prohibiting gun
possession by persons subject to domestic restraining orders did not violate the Second
Amendment).
29. Id. (noting that the nexus between lawless behavior and an enjoined party is
minimally sufficient to support a bar from gun possession while the order is in effect).
30. Cf. Confirmation Hearing for Judge John G. Roberts to be Chief Justice of the
United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 594 (2005) (statement
of John G. Roberts, Assoc. J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Dist. of Columbia Cir.)
(declining to provide his personal views as to the nature of the Second Amendment
right because he felt the issue was likely to reach the Supreme Court).
31. D.C. Code §§ 7-2502.02(a)(4), 7-2507.02, 22-4504, 22-4515 (2001); see
Jeffrey Rosen, Forced into a Gun Debate, TIME, May 7, 2007, at 33 (noting that the
District’s gun ban is among the nation’s most radical gun control laws, and that no state
has a substantially similar ban).
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effective date of the Firearms Control Regulation Act of 1975.32 One of the
strictest gun bans in the United States, the District’s law also restricted
registered firearms, requiring owners to disable or disassemble and unload
their guns, and forbidding an owner from transporting the guns from his or
her property.33
Congressional opposition quickly emerged, and Representative Ron Paul
(R-TX) declared that the law would fail under legal challenge.34 Yet
straightforward attempts to legislate over the District’s gun laws have
failed repeatedly.35 In the 110th Congress, legislation is pending in both
the House and the Senate that would repeal the District’s gun laws.36
Despite seemingly broad support, such legislation is unlikely to reach
enactment given its highly partisan nature and the potential for political
fallout.37
2. The Litigation: Parker v. District of Columbia
In the last few years, the focus of efforts to overturn the District’s gun
laws have moved from Congress to the courts.38 Six carefully selected
plaintiffs filed their case on February 10, 2003 in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia.39 Prior similar cases involved criminals
who attempted to invoke the Second Amendment to rebut their felony
32. See Joan Indiana Rigdon, Gun Fight, WASH. LAW., Aug. 2007, at 21
(discussing how the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives targeted the
District and ten other cities for a reduction in handgun violence). See generally
Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975, 23 D.C. Reg. 2464 (Oct. 1, 1976) (banning
all functioning firearms from use in the home for self-defense).
33. Rigdon, supra note 32, at 21 (describing how an amendment to the District’s
laws even prohibited registered gun owners from moving their guns from room to room
within their own homes).
34. See id. at 21-22 (observing that Congress may have been reacting to a
perceived power grab; the District codified the gun laws within its health code, rather
than its criminal code, to circumvent congressional and presidential disapproval).
35. A History of Gun Control, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2007, at C4 (describing failed
attempts by Congress to revoke or amend the District’s gun ban in 1976, 1999, 2003,
2004, and 2005).
36. See District of Columbia Personal Protection Act, S. 1001 and H.R. 1399,
110th Cong. (2007) (listing nearly half the Senate, and over half the House, as
cosponsors).
37. See Steve Goldstein, Despite Tragedy, Congress Cautious About Gun Laws,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 22, 2007, at A19 (describing the opinion of political pundits that
supporting the 1994 ban on assault weapons cost Democrats the majority in Congress).
38. Rigdon, supra note 32, at 25-26 (explaining that between February and April
2003, eleven litigants filed two cases in the same court seeking a ruling on the
District’s gun laws).
39. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103, 109 (D.D.C. 2004)
(refusing to provide the plaintiffs pre-enforcement relief); Rigdon, supra note 32, at 25
(exposing Parker as a carefully constructed test case that involved plaintiffs without
criminal backgrounds and that would require a direct ruling on Second Amendment
grounds).
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charges, but the Parker litigants were a far more sympathetic group.40 All
six plaintiffs were District residents who wished to possess handguns in
their respective homes for self-defense; one plaintiff owned a registered
shotgun and wished to keep it assembled and unlocked and another was a
District special police officer who carried a handgun at work and wanted
one at home.41
Despite its potential to force a definitive ruling on the Second
Amendment, the National Rifle Association (“NRA”) opposed Parker.42
On April 4, 2003, the NRA filed its own test case, Seegars v. Ashcroft.43
The NRA tried unsuccessfully to join Seegars with Parker.44 The court
dismissed the Seegars litigation after ruling that all of its plaintiffs lacked
standing.45 The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s
dismissal of Seegars for lack of standing.46 Soon thereafter, the District
Court also granted the District’s motion to dismiss Parker on standing
grounds.47
3. The District of Columbia Circuit Adopts an Individual Right to Keep and
Bear Arms
On appeal, however, the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the
District Court’s dismissal of Parker, holding that plaintiff Dick Heller had
standing because he applied for, and the District denied him, a license to
register a handgun to keep in his home.48 The Parker court held that a ban
40. Rigdon, supra note 32, at 25 (reasoning that sympathetic plaintiffs in a “clean”
case would be more likely to prevail and more likely to obtain certiorari from the
Supreme Court).
41. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (affirming
that the plaintiffs did not seek relief enabling them to carry weapons outside of their
homes).
42. Rigdon, supra note 32, at 22, 25 (discussing that the NRA encouraged the
Parker counsel not to file the case, or at least to build in a “trap door” so that the court
could avoid ruling directly on the Second Amendment; the NRA supports the pending
federal legislation to repeal the District’s gun laws in order to moot the litigation).
43. See id. at 26 (noting that the Seegars counsel had done some preliminary
research for the Parker case and that the Parker counsel decried Seegars as a “copycat”
litigation); see also 297 F. Supp. 2d 201, 203 (D.D.C. 2004) (asserting a right to bear
arms in the home for self-defense).
44. Rigdon, supra note 32, at 25 (describing how the Parker counsel wanted to
avoid the perception of NRA sponsorship).
45. Seegars, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 216 (noting that the plaintiffs were essentially
asking for pre-enforcement review because they were unlikely to be prosecuted).
46. See Seegars v. Gonzales, 396 F.3d 1248, 1254-56 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
47. Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103, 109 (D.D.C. 2004)
(rejecting an individual right theory and finding that the plaintiffs failed to state a
viable claim).
48. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding
that the denial of a license by state regulation or administrative scheme is an Article III
injury).
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on the possession and movement of handguns inside the home, and a
provision requiring that legally possessed firearms be rendered essentially
inoperable, were unconstitutional.49 Holding that the District’s gun laws
violated the Second Amendment, the District of Columbia Circuit struck
down the District’s gun ban.50 The District appealed the ruling, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in late 2007.51
What distinguishes Parker from Emerson is that a court held for the first
time that the Second Amendment protected an individual right to bear arms
while simultaneously striking down the underlying gun control law.52 Even
so, one thing is certain: no rights are absolute.53 The government may
infringe even fundamental rights where it can show that the law uses the
least restrictive means necessary to achieve a compelling government
purpose.54 Even if the court affirms a fundamental right to bear arms,
however, many gun control laws will survive a reasonableness review
balancing test.55
III. ANALYSIS
It has been nearly seven decades since the Supreme Court last decided a
case involving the interpretation of the Second Amendment.56 In that case,
United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court opted simply to dispose of the
case at bar rather than actually provide a thorough explanation of the nature
and reach of the Second Amendment.57 The time has come, however, for

49. Id. at 400-01.
50. Id. at 401 (holding that the District could not completely ban at-home firearms

possession for use in lawful self-defense).
51. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Will Decide if Handgun Kept at Home Is
Individual Right, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2007, at A1.
52. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 399 (noting that such protections are not absolute and
the government may regulate firearms possession).
53. Id. at 399 (listing presumably reasonable prohibitions on carrying a gun,
including when intoxicated, to a public assembly, for terrorism purposes, or when
concealed).
54. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Editorial, A Well-Regulated Right to Bear Arms,
WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2007, at A15 (noting that the First Amendment protects a
fundamental, but not absolute, right to free speech; accordingly, reasonable gun control
laws may not offend the Second Amendment).
55. Winkler, supra note 21, at 719-20.
56. See Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 479-81 (describing the lack of substantive
discussion of the Second Amendment in casebooks and in the most recent Supreme
Court decision on the subject, United States v. Miller, and asserting that the Second
Amendment is ideal for teaching constitutional law because it lends itself to either
theory).
57. 307 U.S. 174, 182-83 (1939) (remanding the case for further proceedings
without construing the scope or nature of the substantive right protected by the Second
Amendment).
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the Supreme Court to provide that long overdue explanation.58 In March
2008, the Supreme Court heard oral argument on District of Columbia v.
Heller, renamed on appeal, to determine the true nature and scope of the
right that the Second Amendment protects, to mend the split among the
federal circuits and to provide guidance to the lower courts.59
A. The Supreme Court Should Affirm the District of Columbia Circuit and
Hold That the Second Amendment Protects an Individual Right to Keep and
Bear Arms
The Supreme Court should affirm the decision of the District of
Columbia Circuit and hold that the Second Amendment protects an
individual right to keep and bear arms because the Parker decision reflects
the collective wisdom of the states, academia, and a growing trend within
the judiciary.60 Furthermore, the Supreme Court should affirm the District
of Columbia Circuit because a textual analysis of the Second Amendment
supports an individual right theory61 Finally, the Supreme Court should
affirm Parker and confirm that the only existing Supreme Court precedent,
United States v. Miller, did not in fact hold that the Second Amendment
protects only a collective right to keep and bear arms.62
1. The Individual Right Theorists Are Not Alone: Political, Academic, and
Judicial Support for the Individual Right Theory
Contrary to the District’s assertions in Parker, there is ample support for
the individual right theory.63
At the state-level, forty-four state
58. See David Nakamura, D.C. Wants High Court to Hear Gun Case; City
Defending Restrictive Law, WASH. POST, July 17, 2007, at A1 (reporting that the
president of the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence characterized Parker as
potentially the most significant Second Amendment ruling in American history).
59. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 29-30 (arguing that Parker
prevents the District from saving lives through the enforcement of its gun laws); see
also Brief in Response to Petition for Certiorari at 2, District of Columbia v. Heller,
128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (No. 07-290) (asserting the need for a resolution to the circuit
split on the profoundly important issue of the Second Amendment).
60. See Brief for the States of Texas, Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Utah, and Wyoming as
Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants, Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370,
at 21-22, 29-30 (D.C. Cir. June 16, 2006) (No. 04-7041) [hereinafter Brief for the
States of Texas et al. in Support of Appellants] (arguing that the legal scholarship, the
trends in constitutional law, and all the states support the individual right theory).
61. See Robert A. Levy, Individual Ruling, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Mar. 13, 2007,
http://search.nationalreview.com/ (search “National Review Online” for “Levy” on date
Mar. 13, 2007; then follow link “Individual Ruling”) (asserting that the text, the
history, and the intention of the framers support an individual right theory).
62. Brief in Response to Petition for Certiorari, supra note 59, at 7.
63. See Brief for the States of Texas et al. in Support of Appellants, supra note 60,
at 1 (describing states’ interests in having a final decision on the merits of the Second
Amendment).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol16/iss3/4

10

Dupree: A Shot Heard 'Round The District: The District of Columbia Circui

2008]

A SHOT HEARD ’ROUND THE DISTRICT

423

constitutions protect an individual right to keep and bear arms.64 All fifty
state legislatures protect a private citizen’s right to own a handgun.65
Forty-five states go even further and permit citizens to carry concealed
handguns for self-defense.66 Additionally, even before the Fifth Circuit’s
decision in Emerson, the United States government took the position that
the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms.67
In 2004, the Department of Justice concluded that the individual right
theory of the Second Amendment is the only persuasive theory of
interpretation.68
In addition to widespread political acceptance among the state
legislatures and by the federal government, the individual right theory has
gained traction within academia.69 In the last twenty years, legal
scholarship from across the political spectrum, including scholars who
previously embraced the collective right theory, has moved largely to
embrace the theory that the Second Amendment protects an individual right
to keep and bear arms.70 While it was politically consistent for liberals to
64. See id. at 2 (noting that a finding by the Supreme Court stating that the Second
Amendment protects only a collective, and not an individual, right would endanger the
majority of state constitutions and would create uncertainty as to whether citizens who
otherwise are allowed to carry a weapon lawfully would be subjected to unlawful arrest
upon entering the District); see also Winkler, supra note 21, at 686 n.11 (listing the six
states without a constitutional right to bear arms: California, Iowa, Maryland,
Minnesota, New Jersey, and New York).
65. David P. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU
L. REV. 1359, 1410 n.190.
66. Brief for the States of Texas et al. in Support of Appellants, supra note 60, at
29-32 (describing the District’s handgun ban as not only violative of the Constitution,
but also contrary to every state legislature).
67. Letter from John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney Gen., to James Jay Baker, Executive
Dir. of the Nat’l Rifle Ass’n Inst. For Legislative Action (May 17, 2001), available at
http://www.nraila.org/images/Ashcroft.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2008) (stating that
Attorney General Ashcroft’s unequivocal opinion is that the Second Amendment
protects an individual right to keep and bear arms); see also Memorandum from the
Attorney Gen. to all United States’ Attorneys, Re: United States v. Emerson (Nov. 9,
2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/emerson.htm (last visited
Mar. 21, 2008) [hereinafter Memorandum from the Attorney General] (discussing the
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Emerson and characterizing it as the correct interpretation of
the Second Amendment).
68. Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General: Whether the Second
Amendment Secures an Individual Right, 1-2 (Aug. 24, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/secondamendment2.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2008)
[hereinafter Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General, Second Amendment].
69. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 43 (Amy Guttman ed., 1997) (arguing that the framers’ original belief was
that the right to self-defense was an essential liberty and “absolutely fundamental”).
70. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 938 n.2 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (noting that the scholarly commentary is correctly trending toward an
individual right theory of the Second Amendment); see also Carl T. Bogus, The History
and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship: A Primer, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 14
(2000) (discussing the history and politics surrounding the trend toward supporting the
individual right theory, including financial incentives provided by the NRA, and noting
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interpret the Second Amendment narrowly in order to continue their
traditional support for gun control efforts, interpreting the Second
Amendment narrowly is legally inconsistent with interpreting other
provisions in the Bill of Rights, most of which liberals prefer to read
expansively.71 Even law professor Laurence Tribe, a noted liberal law
scholar, has moved from advocating for the collective right position to
unequivocally, if not enthusiastically, embracing the individual right theory
in his treatise on constitutional law.72 The Parker court cited this
conversion by a former collective right theorist as an example of the
change in legal scholarship to support the individual right theory.73
Finally, while the judiciary moves slower than the legislatures or
academia, there is now an unmistakable split among the circuits that is
trending toward an individual right interpretation of the Second
Amendment.74 While the vast majority of the circuits adhere to the
collective right theory, the Fifth Circuit and the District of Columbia
Circuit have embraced the individual right theory, and the Second Circuit
has not decided the issue.75
When the Fifth Circuit upheld a federal law barring gun ownership by
persons subject to domestic restraining orders, it did so despite finding that
that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear
that law review articles supporting the individual right theory outpaced articles
supporting the collective right theory by a nearly 2:1 ratio).
71. See Liptak, supra note 13, at A18 (noting that some legal scholars suggest
comparing the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms to the First Amendment’s
protection for free speech, which liberals traditionally argue should be interpreted
broadly); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 477-78 (noting the ironic politics
surrounding gun rights, with conservatives arguing for an uncharacteristically broad
reading of the Second Amendment when compared with their interpretation of other
provisions of the Bill of Rights).
72. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 902 n.221 (3d ed.
2000) (arguing that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to use a
firearm in self-defense and not merely a collective right of the states); Laurence H.
Tribe & Akhil Reed Amar, Well-Regulated Militias, and More, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28,
1999 (suggesting, following the Columbine tragedy, that an individual right
notwithstanding, reasonable gun control laws are constitutional).
73. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(comparing favorably the treatise of law professor Laurence Tribe with the leading
authorities of the nineteenth century).
74. Brief in Response to Petition for Certiorari, supra note 59, at 1 (describing the
split between the federal circuits and the state courts of last resort, and between the
local court of last resort and federal circuit court within the District).
75. See, e.g., Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002); Gillespie v.
City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Wright, 117
F.3d 1265, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d
Cir. 1996); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hale,
978 F.2d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976); Cases v. United
States, 131 F.2d 916, 921-23 (1st Cir. 1942) (holding that the Second Amendment
protects a collective, and not an individual, right to keep and bear arms).
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arms.76 The Emerson holding is significant because it not only began the
schism among the circuits by interpreting the Second Amendment to
protect an individual right to keep and bear arms, but also because in
sustaining a federal restriction on that right, the court also limited the scope
of that right, finding that the right to keep and bear arms was neither
fundamental nor absolute.77
Similarly, when the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Second
Amendment protected an individual right to keep and bear arms and struck
down the gun laws at issue in Parker, the Court also suggested that Second
Amendment rights were not absolute because these rights are subject to the
same sorts of restrictions as the First Amendment.78 It is clear that the
Parker court did not invent an individual right interpretation of the Second
Amendment out of whole cloth; it merely built on what the Fifth Circuit
started and what represents the views of the fifty states, the Department of
Justice, leading legal scholars, and at least two Supreme Court justices.79
Lastly, over the last five years, a growing chorus of dissent within even
the liberal Ninth Circuit threatens to add yet another circuit to this growing
minority.80 In a scathing dissent from a decision denying rehearing of a
constitutional challenge to amendments to a state gun control law, Circuit
Judge Kozinski suggested that the panel was selectively reading the
Constitution to suit political ideologies and preferences.81 Given that the
panel split five to four on the decision denying rehearing, it may be fair to
consider the Ninth Circuit a natural next proponent of the individual right
theory.82

76. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 264-65 (5th Cir. 2001) (agreeing with
the lower court that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and
bear arms but disagreeing that the federal statute in question impermissibly infringes
that substantive right).
77. See id. at 224 n.19 (citing the Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Warin
and finding that Second Amendment protection for an individual right to keep and bear
arms would not be an absolute right, free from congressional regulation).
78. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 399 (noting that even First Amendment protections,
which use absolutist language, are not absolute but are subject to reasonable
government regulation, including time, place, and manner restrictions).
79. See Brief in Response to Petition for Certiorari, supra note 59, at 15 (arguing
that 161 years of state appellate court decisions support an individual right
interpretation of the Second Amendment).
80. See Nordyke v. King, 364 F.3d 1025, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004) (denying rehearing
en banc with dissents), cert. denied, 843 U.S. 820 (2004) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting)
(“[O]ur court’s view of the Second Amendment is indefensible.”).
81. See Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 2003) (denying rehearing
en banc, with dissents) (Kozinski, J. dissenting) (describing the panel’s tortured
interpretation of the Second Amendment as having “all the grace of a sumo wrestler
trying to kill a rattlesnake by sitting on it and [being] just as likely to succeed.”).
82. See id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the collective right theory is
incorrect).
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2. But What Does It All Mean: A Textual Analysis of the Second
Amendment Supports the Individual Right Theory
Critics of Parker argue that its holding requires an inaccurate reading of
the constitutional language.83 Given that there are historical arguments that
both support and dispute the Parker holding, the District cannot support its
argument with only an appeal to historical intent and usage.84 The
language of the Second Amendment reads, “[a] well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”85 The second comma in the
amendment divides it into two clauses; the first clause is prefatory
(introductory) and the second is operative (effective).86 This curiously
drafted amendment has generated a lively debate on the drafters’ intent and
its relevance for present-day gun control efforts.87
a. Parsing The Language: The Structure of the Clauses and the Word
Choice Used in the Second Amendment Support the Individual
Right Theory
The structure of the clauses and the word choice used in the Second
Amendment support an individual right interpretation of the language.88
The District in Parker incorrectly argued that the plaintiffs misconstrued
the prefatory clause.89 Simply because the prefatory clause expresses a
83. See, e.g., Parker, 478 F.3d at 402 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (agreeing with
Seegars that the District is not a state within the meaning of the Second Amendment
and therefore, Second Amendment protections do not attach). While it is unclear
whether the Supreme Court will credit this argument, the issue is beyond the scope of
this Comment.
84. See Chemerinsky, supra note 54, at A15 (discussing how collective right
theorists emphasize the prefatory clause while individual right theorists emphasize the
operative clause, and explaining how two federal courts of appeals have reviewed the
history surrounding the terms “militia” and “keep and bear arms” only to come to
completely opposite conclusions about their original meanings).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
86. Parker, 478 F.3d at 378 (noting that the District’s argument focuses on the
meaning of the prefatory clause as controlling the Second Amendment, while the
plaintiff’s argument focuses on the meaning of the operative clause).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (holding that the
Second Amendment does not protect a right to possess firearms that are not ordinary
militia weapons); United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 264-65 (5th Cir. 2001)
(finding an individual right to keep and bear arms while sustaining a law restricting
firearms possession in domestic violence cases); Parker, 478 F.3d at 401 (striking the
District’s ban on handguns as inconsistent with an individual right to keep and bear
arms).
88. See Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early
American Origins of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 497 (2004) (describing
how the phrase “right of the people” has come to mean an individual right but also
could have meant a collective, or militia, right as it was used in the eighteenth century).
89. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 378 (noting the plaintiffs conceded that the prefatory
clause expressed a collective, civic purpose but did not concede that this purpose
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fundamental of good government, however, does not mean that this
principal limits or controls the meaning of the operative clause that
follows.90
To the contrary, as the District of Columbia Circuit correctly noted, at
the time of the Second Amendment’s adoption it was common to use
prefatory language to express a fundamental of good government that was
narrower than the operative language used to accomplish it.91 For example,
the prefatory language preceding the Copyright Clause of the Constitution
directs Congress to grant copyrights for the purpose of “promot[ing] the
progress of science and the useful arts.”92 Yet the Supreme Court
determined that the prefatory clause did not constitute a limit on Congress’s
powers, and this holding is instructive for interpreting the prefatory
language of the Second Amendment.93
While the prefatory language of the Copyright Clause describes a desired
political result—progress and invention—it does not limit Congress’s
legislative power to achieving that singular result; additional public
benefits flowing from Congress’s grant of a copyright might also result,
such as incentive for continued innovation to other inventors.94 Likewise,
the drafters of the Constitution believed that the Second Amendment
protected an individual right to keep and bear arms, and from that
protection flowed a political benefit: the Second Amendment would
prevent the federal government from destroying or dismantling the
militia.95
The District also incorrectly argued that the plaintiffs misconstrued the
phrases “the people,” and “to keep and bear arms” by construing the
Second Amendment to protect an individual right to keep and bear arms.96
The plain language of the Second Amendment protects and guarantees a
qualified the nature of the right provided by the operative clause that follows).
90. Id.
91. See id. at 389 (suggesting that the structure of the Second Amendment is not
unusual when compared to state constitutional provisions).
92. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 211-12 (2003) (addressing whether the
prefatory language functioned to limit Congress’s power to grant copyrights or whether
Congress retained broad powers to authorize copyrights).
93. See id. at 212 (describing the Copyright Clause as both a “power and a
limitation” and explaining that the Constitution requires that Congress set up a system
that accomplishes the goal of the prefatory language, not that the prefatory language
limits Congress’s power to legislate).
94. See id. at 213.
95. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 382 (noting that the Constitution is a political
document and therefore an appropriate place to make political points).
96. Id. at 378-84 (arguing that the phrase “the people” refers to a militia or some
subset of individuals rather than taking a broad view that “the people” encompass all
citizens, and that the phrase “to keep and bear arms” is purely militaristic and evokes a
civic duty, not a private guarantee).
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“right” to “the people.”97 Similarly, the First and Fourth Amendments,
submitted and ratified contemporaneously with the Second Amendment,
each protect a right of “the people” and not of “the states.”98 It is clear that
the framers intended “the people” to be a term of art, and these capable
draftsmen used “the people” in the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth
Amendments to refer to “a class of persons who are part of a national
community.”99 While the District incorrectly argued that the phrase “to
keep and bear arms” could indicate only a military use, there is historical
support that the framers intended the phrase to indicate private purposes not
involving a militia.100 For example, the right to keep and bear arms for
private use, including for hunting and self-defense, existed prior to the
creation of the American government under the Constitution.101 This
historical support contradicted the District’s argument and correctly
persuaded the District of Columbia Circuit that whatever else it
encompasses, the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep
and bear arms for self-defense purposes.102
b. Location, Location, Location: The Proximity of the Second
Amendment to Other Amendments Protecting Individual Rights
Supports the Individual Right Theory
The placement of the Second Amendment and its proximity to other
individual right amendments within the Bill of Rights lends further
credence to proponents of the individual right theory.103 Indeed, the Bill of
Rights consists almost entirely of amendments that protect individual, not
collective, rights.104 The Tenth Amendment, which reserves to the states
97. See Brief for the State of Texas et al. in Support of Appellants, supra note 60,
at 7-8 (emphasizing that in construing the meaning of the Second Amendment, courts
must assume the framers intended the ordinary meaning of words).
98. Id. at 8.
99. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
100. Parker, 478 F.3d at 384, 395 (acknowledging that the phrase appeared in state
constitutional provisions in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century that were
understood to encompass a private use of arms, including hunting and self-defense).
101. See id. (describing how the right to keep and bear arms served as a political
salve that allowed the Federalists to satisfy the Antifederalists that citizens would have
their weapons ready in the event the militia mustered). This civic purpose, while
important, does not limit Second Amendment protection to militia service or require
participation in a militia to enjoy the right to keep and bear arms. Id.
102. Id. at 381-82.
103. Id. (noting that courts have never have doubted that the purpose of the
protections guaranteed to “the people,” and referred to in the First, Fourth, Ninth, and
Tenth Amendments, was to protect individuals from the federal government; the
Second Amendment is proximate to these Amendments and uses the same
terminology).
104. U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting freedom of speech, press, religion, petition,
and assembly); U.S. CONST. amend. II (protecting the right to keep and bear arms);
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those powers not delegated to the federal government, comes not only at
the end of the Bill of Rights but indicates that the framers were perfectly
capable of distinguishing between “the people” and “states.”105 It is
unlikely that the framers would have chosen to place a state’s right among
the individual rights protected by the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Amendments.106 Furthermore, it is even more
unlikely that the framers would use the phrase “the people” to refer to
individual rights in the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments while
intending “the people” to mean “state governments” in the Second
Amendment.107
3. Clear as Mud: The Only Controlling Precedent, United States v. Miller,
Did Not Establish Protection for a Collective Right Under the Second
Amendment
While the majority of circuits have construed Miller to protect only a
collective right under the Second Amendment, it is not because the
decision clearly indicates that was the Supreme Court’s intention.108 More
likely, the Miller court attempted to answer the question before it without
ever intending to create a rule of general applicability for courts to use in
future Second Amendment cases.109
U.S. CONST. amend. III (protecting freedom from forced quartering of troops); U.S.
CONST. amend. IV (protecting from unreasonable search and seizure); U.S. CONST.
amend. V (protecting freedom from self-incrimination and double jeopardy, and the
right to due process and private property); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (protecting, inter
alia, the right to a jury in a criminal trial); U.S. CONST. amend. VII (protecting the right
to a jury in a civil trial); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (protecting from cruel and unusual
punishment and excessive bail); U.S. CONST. amend. IX (protecting rights not
otherwise enumerated in the Bill of Rights).
105. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 381-83 (discussing how consideration of the Bill of
Rights as a whole, rather than as a collection of individual amendments, reinforces the
argument that the Second Amendment protects an individual right; it would be “an
inexplicable aberration” to read the amendment in any other way).
106. Brief for the State of Texas et al. in Support of Appellants, supra note 60, at 10
(noting that this would require the framers to switch between listing individual rights in
the First Amendment, to a state right in the Second Amendment, and then back to
individual rights in the next six amendments).
107. Id. at 10-11 (describing this unlikely scenario as a “tortured construction” of
the Bill of Rights and noting that James Madison had intended originally to insert each
provision of the Bill of Rights into the appropriate section of the Constitution, rather
than placing it as a whole at the end; Madison would have placed the protections in
what became the Second Amendment into article I, section 9, which protects the
original “individual rights” in the Constitution, e.g., habeas corpus, and not in the
section containing military and militia clauses, article I, section 8 and article I, section
10).
108. See id. at 19 (asserting that if the Supreme Court had discerned that the Second
Amendment protected only a collective right, the decision would have turned on
Miller’s lack of membership in a militia, not on the Supreme Court’s lack of judicial
notice that sawed-off shotguns were of the kind commonly used by a militia).
109. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 939 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring)
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Although nine circuit courts have read Miller to protect the collective
right of state militias under the Second Amendment, the decision also can
be construed to provide an individual right to use militia-grade weaponry,
which simply did not include sawed-off shotguns.110 Alternatively, the
Miller court’s holding can be construed as simply answering the question
before the Supreme Court. Rather than laying down a rule of general
applicability, the Miller holding was intended only to dispose of the case at
bar.111 This interpretation of Miller is reasonable given the variables
inherent in Second Amendment cases.112
Accordingly, courts should not seek to design a general test but should
decide Second Amendment cases on their own facts.113 A case-by-case
approach will provide the flexibility needed for courts to make reasonable
decisions and distinctions.114 For example, although the District’s gun laws
are unconstitutional because they allow for a ban on the use of functional
firearms inside the home for self-defense purposes, the federal law
restricting persons who are subject to domestic violence restraining orders
from possessing firearms while the order is in effect passes constitutional
muster.115 Using case-by-case analysis and deciding each case on its own
facts should not lead the lower courts into confusion. On the contrary,
deciding each case based on the facts presented, and using a common
standard of review, should provide courts with the certainty they will need
to determine whether a gun law crosses the line into unconstitutional
infringement of the Second Amendment.116
(noting that the Miller Court simply decided the case at bar without delving into the
nature of the Second Amendment’s protection of a substantive right); see also Cases v.
United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942) (interpreting the Miller holding as
dependent on whether the weapon in question was of the kind related to a wellregulated militia).
110. See Cases, 131 F.2d at 922.
111. Id.
112. Id. (analogizing Second Amendment cases to due process cases and suggesting
that a factual analysis is more desirable than a bright-line rule).
113. See Winkler, supra note 21, at 714 (noting that gun control efforts must strike a
balance between the individual right to lawful self-defense and the collective right of
the people to protection from the government).
114. See id. at 715 (arguing that the government may regulate the right to bear arms
in order to protect the people, but it may not completely disarm the people in order to
achieve that goal).
115. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 399 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(describing the kinds of reasonable gun regulations the framers may have envisioned
and asserting that such regulations would not offend the Second Amendment, including
prohibitions on felons possessing firearms and carrying of concealed weapons); United
States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 261 (5th Cir. 2001) (discussing how reasonable
regulations that are consistent with the historical protections afforded by the Second
Amendment would be constitutional, including restrictions on firearms possession by
infants and adults with unsound minds).
116. See Cases, 131 F.2d at 922.
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B. The Supreme Court Should Affirm That Second Amendment Rights Are
Not Fundamental and That Courts Should Use a Reasonableness Review
Balancing Test When Deciding Second Amendment Cases
The Parker holding is reasonable and recognizes that the Second
Amendment protects pre-existing common law rights while allowing for
government regulation for the public safety.117 This approach does not
invite a “parade of horribles,” nor does it completely eliminate the
District’s ability and authority to regulate guns.118 Rather, Parker supports
the proposition that the government may limit Second Amendment rights
with reasonable restrictions because Second Amendment rights are not
fundamental and do not require a strict scrutiny or heightened review
analysis.119
To date, neither the Supreme Court nor the circuit courts have held that
the Second Amendment is a fundamental right.120 Nor should the Supreme
Court deem the right fundamental: gun owners are not a suspect class and
do not have a history of persecution.121 Without a suspect designation or a
history of persecution, strict or even intermediate scrutiny would be
inappropriate and would unnecessarily endanger otherwise constitutional
and effective gun control efforts.122
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should use a reasonableness review
balancing test for Second Amendment cases.123 Using a reasonableness
review balancing test will allow the Supreme Court to protect the
constitutional rights of the people without reaching the absurd result that a

117. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 399.
118. See Levy, supra note 61 (noting that Parker did not involve machine guns,

assault weapons, or concealed firearms, and that it was limited to the individual
possession of a functional handgun inside one’s home for self-defense purposes).
119. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 399 (discussing presumably reasonable restrictions
such as time, place, and manner restrictions and prior Supreme Court decisions
sustaining prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons or of convicted felons owning
guns).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 216 (6th Cir. 1999) (declaring
that the right to possess an assault rifle is not fundamental because there is no
individual right to own a firearm); United States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115, 128 (2d Cir.
1984) (characterizing the Second Amendment right as not fundamental because there is
no individual right to own a firearm, and upholding the validity of a federal law
concerning transporting firearms).
121. See Olympic Arms v. Buckles, 301 F.3d 384, 388-89 (6th Cir. 2002).
122. See, e.g., Parker, 478 F.3d at 399 (discussing prohibiting convicted felons from
possessing firearms as a presumably constitutional, and reasonable, limitation of
Second Amendment rights); United States v. Wicks, 132 F.3d 383, 389 (7th Cir. 1997)
(upholding a previous ruling that felons are not a suspect class and asserting Congress
need only a rational reason to prohibit felons from possessing firearms).
123. See Winkler, supra note 21, at 714 (noting that the notoriously intractable
problems of violence and crime argue in favor of gun regulation but a heightened
review analysis by the courts may impede legislative attempts at a solution).
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state cannot exercise its police power to regulate for the health, safety, and
welfare of its citizens.124 Indeed, using this same balancing test has
overwhelmingly allowed state gun control laws to withstand judicial
scrutiny for nearly half a century.125
The Supreme Court should adopt this reasonableness standard so that
federal gun control laws will survive scrutiny unless the individual can
prove a material infringement of his or her right to self-defense.126 A law
constitutes material infringement when it prevents a law-abiding, mentally
stable adult from lawful self-defense.127 Upon a showing by the
government that the law furthers a legitimate government purpose that
outweighs the burden on the individual, the gun control law will survive.128
C. The District’s Gun Laws as Written Are Unreasonable, but Reasonable
and Effective Gun Control Laws May Not Offend the Second Amendment
The District’s gun ban is the strictest in the nation, prohibiting its
citizens from maintaining even registered firearms in a functioning
condition within their own homes for self-defense purposes.129 In its
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, the District admitted it drafted
its question presented—whether it could ban handguns while allowing
lawfully registered long arms—based on the assumption that lawful
firearms are available for self-defense.130 This question presented is
spurious, however, because under the District’s laws, no person may keep a
124. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 399-400 (suggesting that under rational basis review
nearly every gun control law may be upheld as constitutional); BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1196 (8th ed. 2004) (describing police power as the government’s
inherent power to enforce public security, order, health, morality, and justice).
125. Winkler, supra note 21, at 718 (noting that state courts have invalidated only
six gun control laws since World War II).
126. See Calvin Massey, Elites, Identity Politics, Guns, and the Manufacture of
Legal Rights, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 573, 587 (2004) (arguing that the individual right to
keep and bear arms is far from absolute and that “a great deal of regulation” is
appropriate and desirable).
127. Parker, 478 F.3d at 399 (reasoning that felonious conduct and insanity,
qualities that present a danger to society as a whole, may also prevent a person from
legally possessing a firearm).
128. Massey, supra note 126, at 587.
129. Brief of Amicus Curiae Congress of Racial Equality in Support of Appellants
Seeking Reversal at 22-24, Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (No. 04-7041) [hereinafter C.O.R.E. Brief] (describing how even registered and
legally owned firearms must be kept unloaded, disassembled, or locked, rendering them
essentially useless for self-defense purposes); see also Massey, supra note 126, at 587
(arguing that the real aim of gun control advocates is to eliminate private gun
ownership).
130. See Brief in Response to Petition for Certiorari, supra note 59, at 18 (arguing
that the District’s question presented could just as easily ask whether the District could
ban handguns while allowing bricks or other non-firearm weaponry, given that
possessing functional firearms is illegal).
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lawfully possessed firearm assembled, unlocked, and ready for use in selfdefense.131 Even the District recognized that it is extreme and unreasonable
to prosecute a resident for using a firearm for self-defense inside his or her
home, and the District unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the District of
Columbia Circuit that a court would not apply the full force of the law
against such a defendant.132 Unconvinced, the District of Columbia Circuit
noted that such an assurance would not suffice where a constitutional right
hung in the balance.133
Despite the District’s attempt to spin the litigation on appeal and in its
petition for certiorari, the true question before the Supreme Court is
whether the District may lawfully ban all functioning firearms, including
handguns, without running afoul of the Second Amendment.134 The
District of Columbia Circuit held that the District could not and struck
down the District’s gun ban.135
Assuming the Supreme Court upholds the District of Columbia Circuit
and finds that the Second Amendment protects a non-fundamental,
individual right to keep and bear arms, the District still will not lose all
ability or authority to regulate gun possession.136 For over a century, the
states have successfully regulated gun possession without impinging the
Second Amendment.137 At present, the District’s law only serves to
prohibit possession of functional firearms for self-defense from the people
who need them the most: the law-abiding, mentally sound, men and women
of the District.138 The District should rewrite its law to allow its citizens to
lawfully possess firearms, including handguns, that are fully functional

131. Id. at 19-23 (noting that the District admitted the Supreme Court could reframe
its question presented and arguing that such reframing is necessary before oral
argument).
132. Parker, 478 F.3d at 400-01 (dismissing the District’s assertion that courts
would likely use a narrowing construction if self-defense was offered as a justification
for unlawful possession).
133. Id. (deciding that judicial lenity cannot cure the unreasonable restriction of a
constitutional right).
134. See Brief in Response to Petition for Certiorari, supra note 59, at 18-19, 22
(citing the District of Columbia Circuit’s holding in Parker that allowing possession of
long arms while disallowing them to be kept in a functioning state is essentially a ban
on all firearms).
135. Parker, 478 F.3d at 401.
136. See Winkler, supra note 21, at 717 (suggesting that under a reasonableness
standard, the court likely will consider any law that is not a complete ban on the right to
keep and bear arms as a “mere regulation” of that right).
137. See id. (noting that the forty-two states with state constitutions that protect an
individual right to keep and bear arms also have a long history of gun control that state
courts find constitutional).
138. Parker, 478 F.3d at 399 n.17 (indicating that the irrational District gun laws
effectively prevent only non-criminals from obtaining guns).
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inside the home for the purpose of self-defense.139
IV. CONCLUSION
The need for self-defense in the District, a city with higher than national
crime rates, is of the utmost importance.140 The District’s 2007 homicide
rate was greater than that of New York, Philadelphia, or Chicago.141 Of
those homicides, seventy-seven percent were gunfire related.142 Even the
District’s non-fatal gun-related crime rates increased.143 These increased
crime rates were not the result of the District of Columbia Circuit’s
decision to strike the District’s gun laws; the law remained in effect while
the District appealed to the Supreme Court.144
Illegal guns flow into the District in numbers so great that criminals
likely pay only a small premium to obtain them.145 Given that District
citizens are at the mercy of police discretion for their protection needs, the
need for adequate self-defense becomes even more critical for day-to-day
survival.146 From outward appearances, the District is fighting a losing

139. See Brief in Response to Petition for Certiorari, supra note 59, at 25.
140. See C.O.R.E. Brief, supra note 129, at 22 (illustrating that the District’s rate of

crimes involving firearms and murders increased since the ban went into effect, rather
than decreased); see also Press Release, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, Sen. Hutchison
Introduces Legislation to Lift D.C. Gun Ban (Mar. 28, 2007), available at http://hutch
ison.senate.gov/pr032807b.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2008) (characterizing the
District’s restrictive gun laws as ineffective since the crime rates increased after its
enactment).
141. See Allison Klein, Killings In D.C. Up After Long Dip; Jump in Gun Crime
Accompanies 2007 Death Toll of 181, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2008, at A1 (noting the
District’s homicide rate of thirty per 100,000 people is still lower than that of Baltimore
and Detroit).
142. See id. (describing a new technology that records gunfire, ShotSpotter, which
recorded approximately fifty gunshots per week in a single police district in the District
of Columbia).
143. See Ernesto Londoato, Region’s Homicide Total Steady For 2007; Declines
Elsewhere Offset Rising Toll in D.C., Pr. George’s, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2008, at B1
(reporting a twenty-four percent increase in armed robberies and a seven percent
increase in other violent gun crimes).
144. Robert Barnes & David Nakamura, Gun Law Prevents Harm, D.C. Argues;
Strict Controls Are Warranted to Quell Violence, Says Brief to Supreme Court, WASH.
POST, Jan. 5, 2008, at A02.
145. See David Nakamura & Robert Barnes, D.C.’s Ban on Handguns in Homes Is
Thrown Out; Fenty Promises to Fight Appellate Court’s Ruling, WASH. POST, Mar. 10,
2007, at A1 (noting that District police can hardly enforce the handgun ban on the
streets and confiscated more than 2,600 guns in 2006).
146. See C.O.R.E. Brief, supra note 129, at 17-18 (commenting that poor and
minority neighborhoods are often subject to both crime and insufficient police
protection); see also Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760-63 (2005) (holding
that citizens have no constitutional right to state protection from crime); United States
v. Panter, 688 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1982) (describing the right to self-defense from a
potentially fatal attack as fundamental).
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battle with violent crime and its own expectations for success.147 Whether
the District’s gun laws actually reduce violent crime is debatable, and
dueling statistics are easy to locate.148
According to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports, violent crime rates
increased exponentially since the enactment of the gun ban, ultimately
reaching a high point of a ninety-seven percent greater rate of violent crime
than before enactment of the gun ban.149 At its zenith, the murder rate was
triple the pre-enactment rate.150 On the other hand, there are studies that
show the District did see a decrease in gun-related homicides following
enactment of its gun laws.151 With statistics like these, the question is not
only whether the gun ban is effective but whether District residents must
also live in peril as a result of ill-conceived gun control laws.
Fortunately, a solution is at hand; the Supreme Court can remedy the
District’s ill-conceived gun laws by affirming the District of Columbia
Circuit and holding that there is an individual right to keep and bear
arms.152 The Supreme Court should go further, however, and hold that this
right is not fundamental and that the proper standard for deciding Second
Amendment cases is a reasonableness review balancing test.153
Affirming that there is an individual right to keep and bear arms will
resolve the split among the circuits and instruct the lower courts on the
meaning of the Second Amendment.154 Finding that the right is not
147. Brief in Response to Petition for Certiorari, supra note 59, at 30 (describing a
former District police chief’s decision to lower the goal for solving homicides to just
over fifty percent).
148. See id. at 27-29 (describing the District’s gun laws as a “complete failure” and
asserting that violent crime rates have actually increased since enacting the ban). But
see generally Colin Loftin et al., Effects of Restrictive Licensing in Handguns on
Homicide and Suicide in the District of Columbia, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1615 (1991)
(showing that gun-related homicides dropped following enactment of the District’s gun
laws and that neighboring Virginia and Maryland, which did not enact such laws, did
not enjoy a decline in gun-related homicides during that time).
149. See Rothstein Catalog on Disaster Recovery and The Disaster Center website,
http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/dccrime.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2008); Klein,
supra note 141, at A1.
150. See Brief in Response to Petition for Certiorari, supra note 59, at 28 (noting
that even now, after thirty years under the ban, the murder rate is over thirty percent
higher than it was in 1976).
151. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 26-27 (reporting that the
homicide rate increases by two percent for every ten percent increase in handgun
ownership).
152. See Brief in Response to Petition for Certiorari, supra note 59, at 2 (arguing
that the Parker decision was narrow and involved a de facto prohibition on functional
firearms for self-defense purposes, rather than regulating mere possession of a
weapon).
153. Id.
154. See Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court
Interpretation of United States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REV.
961, 963 (1996) (asserting that lower courts have distorted the meaning of Miller to the
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fundamental and is subject to a reasonableness review balancing test will
provide the lower courts with a consistent method for determining whether
gun control proposals are constitutional.155 Finally, using a reasonableness
review balancing test will allow states to continue to craft constitutional
gun control measures that are both reasonable and effective.156 The
Supreme Court must provide this guidance because the District, and the
rest of the United States, is depending on it.157

point where they border on intellectual dishonesty).
155. See Brief in Response to Petition for Certiorari, supra note 59, at 6 (suggesting
that the Supreme Court should balance the government’s interest in safety against the
individual’s right, but not advocating for additional heightened scrutiny analysis).
156. See Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 484 n.4.
157. See Carol D. Leonnig, Gun Ban Ruling Puts Fenty on the Spot; Going to High
Court Would Be Risky, WASH. POST, May 17, 2007, at B1 (describing how a Supreme
Court decision could derail gun control efforts in Chicago, Detroit, New York City, and
Massachusetts, and could affect federal gun control efforts including background
checks and the ban on certain assault weapons); Jonathan Turley, A Liberal’s Lament:
The NRA Might Be Right After All, USA TODAY, Oct. 11, 2007, at 12A (asserting that
the District’s appeal endangers laws across the country as this Supreme Court is more
likely than not to uphold Parker).
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